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THE GREAT TACTICIAN:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, OBAMACARE, AND
WALKING THE TIGHTROPE OF PARTISAN
POLITICS
KATHERINE H. BLANKENSHIP*
It is a long accepted and relied upon fiction that for every legal case
and controversy there is but one correct answer.1 Through this fiction is
born a belief that there are clear and objective right and wrong answers to
every issue.2 This dichotomy of correctness creates a divide between two
canons of thought, which in turn creates the split down the aisle that keeps
the branches of our government enmeshed in partisan politics.3
This partisanship not only runs through the political branches but
also inevitably resides in the judiciary.4 The judiciary has long relied on a
belief in one correct answer and traditionally, reaching the correct answer
was achieved through a formalistic, restrained, and objective application of
the law.5 Yet, this approach denied the inevitable truth expressed by Justice
*
J.D., magna cum laude, Belmont University College of Law, 2014. I would like
to thank the entire Belmont Law Review staff, especially my editing team, Sara Page, Alex
Davenport, Addie Wilson, and Christine Davis, the Belmont College of Law founding Law
Review members of 2014, Professor Jeffrey Usman, and my family, especially John Judkins,
Pat Blankenship, and John Blankenship for their love, support and patient proofreading.
1. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and The
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1949)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Remarks] (arguing that the Court uses a conventional vocabulary that
continues to unfortunately presuppose there is only one correct answer and so then there are
two opposing canons on every part).
2. See Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 401.
3. See id. at 401 (noting that because the court relies on a conventional and static
lexicon, and by presupposing there is one correct answer, it binds itself to the perpetuation of
a system with “two opposing canons on almost every point”); see generally Karl N.
Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences—Especially Sociology, 62 HAR. L. REV. 1286, 1296
(1949) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences] (explaining that “[i]f you pose
this question in the world of correct or incorrect doctrine, you enter on a never ending
battle.”).
4. See generally Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1296
(suggesting that the line between judges finding law and making law is ultimately
meaningless because “the judges in fact do both at once”).
5. See L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 436–37 (1934)
(explaining that traditional judicial philosophy based on formalism and restraint grounds
decisions in the mechanical and technical application of the law due to a belief that such
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Holmes that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”6 By consistently relying on a dichotomy of correctness, the
judiciary ignores the inevitable subjectivity embedded in the role of the
judge and promulgates the false misconception that for every legal question
there is one correct answer.7
The judge is not a beacon of objectivity, sitting on high, removed
from the trials and tribulations of the human experience.8 She is just as
enmeshed in the values, desires, disappointments, and the various other
ingredients that are the stuff of human life as everyone else.9 To deny that
such experience is removed from the judge the moment she sits on the
bench is a mistake.10 Her decision is filtered through the lens of her
experience and that experience creates only the absolute, true, correct
answer for her.11 Even adopting a position of judicial restraint, which
values deference to the legislature and limited judicial interference,12 does
not allow the judge to escape the subjective influences that are inevitably
part of decision-making.13 By denying these subjective influences and
techniques created greater predictability, but arguing that such an approach in fact did the
opposite because it ignored the subjective factors that inevitably influence every judge and
judicial decision).
6. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1881).
7. See Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 401; see also Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 363 (1973) (arguing that “values, wants, purposes, desires”
inform every human action. This is crucial because the experience of values not only defines
the state of being human, it also motivates all genuinely human action.”).
8. Robert A. Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial Figure, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 511
(1988) (discussing the traditional herculean judicial model set forth in American culture and
arguing that the ideal of “Judge Hercules,” positioned on high above the human condition,
troublingly removes the judge from the community and “undermines his humanity”).
9. See generally Kennedy, supra note 7, at 363; Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of
Jurisprudence, 51 HARV. L. REV. 777, 788 (1938) (distinguishing judicial review from
scientific analysis and arguing that in the judiciary “a prediction as probable as that of the
physicist predicting the result of a time-worn experiment would not be possible. For in the
experiment every element not present in the prior observations is painstakingly excluded.
Such exclusion is not possible in the actual behavior situations of every-day life, including
that in which the particular judge is to act.”).
10. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 437 (explaining that ignoring the subjective factors that
contribute to judicial review “prevents these ‘non-technical’ considerations from being
talked and written about. It prevents their possible rationalization and systematization.”).
11. See generally Kennedy, supra note 7, at 363; Pound, supra note 9, at 788.
12. David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE
L.J. 449, 450 (1994) (explaining that judicial restraint is a “policy regarding judicial review
of the constitutionality of legislation, a policy according to which courts, and especially the
U.S. Supreme Court, should adopt a cautious or ‘deferential’ attitude toward voiding
legislation on constitutional grounds”).
13. See Wendy Brown Scott, Oliver Wendell Holmes on Equality and Adarand, 47
HOW. L.J. 59, 64 (2003) (discussing Holmes’s departure from traditional formalism and
judicial restraint and accepting that the law is influenced by the “subjective, indeterminate,
and pragmatic” experiences of the judge); see also Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 398
(distinguishing between the use of judicial restraint in easy cases and the difficulty of
restraint in harder cases, framing his argument around the theory that “[h]ard cases make bad
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clinging to a belief that a restrained position creates an objective,
predictable result denies the opportunity to confront and discuss the many
factors that actually influence judicial decision-making.14
However, it is not an overly pessimistic perspective or a harbinger
of disaster to accept the impossibility of true objectivity or consistent
judicial restraint. Such acceptance does not invalidate the authority of the
judiciary; in fact, it might do the exact opposite. The social sciences have
long ago given up the utopic idea that humans can apply analysis without
the influence of their humanness.15 Many social scientists would argue that
the dismissal of fictional objectivity has validated their science, brought
them closer to egalitarianism, and helped dissipate Eurocentric influence.16
But is the law so similarly situated as to benefit from a frank look at judicial
interpretation or do we need this fiction of rightness? Does the whole thing
come crumbling down if the façade is dismantled?
This note argues that true judicial restraint is a fictional
impossibility. Any practice of judicial restraint is at the very same moment
an exercise of judicial activism because a judge cannot approach the law
from a truly objective, mechanical position.17 Every judicial opinion is
influenced not only by the political and moral vantage point of the judge,
but also the judge’s policy and societal concerns.18 This thesis is illustrated
by a case study of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
and, specifically, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion regarding the individual
mandate and the Medicaid provision of the Affordable Care Act. Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion demonstrates how even with the best intentions of
deference, the judiciary is inevitably influenced by partisanship, personal
experience, the current temper of the court, the perceived needs and desires
of the majority, and any number of other factors that make it impossible to
have a truly objective, deferential judiciary.
law,” and explaining that “the proposition that the greater the felt need, because of felt sense,
the wider is the leeway correctly and properly available in reshaping an authority or the
authorities. What is both proper and to be expected in an extreme case would become abuse
and judicial usurpation if made daily practice in the mine-run of cases.”) (emphasis in the
original); Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1304 (“[w]hat is inherent
is that the man must always enter into the result: it is he who must read the words of the rule
of law, it is he who must size up the facts as to whether a rule of law applies. No rule of law
ever applied itself.”).
14. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 437.
15. See generally MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 75
(1949) (arguing that in order to explain laws and factors one must do so through their own
individualized configurations).
16. See generally id. at 64–66 (discussing the challenge social scientists face when
attempting to distinguish between “value-judgments” and “empirical knowledge,” with the
latter requiring scientists to “discuss the meaning of objectively ‘valid’ truths” while
consecutively requiring them to reconcile varying viewpoints that emerge when describing
these so-called truths).
17. See generally Fuller, supra note 5, at 437; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 363; Pound,
supra note 9, at 788.
18. See generally Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1304.
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Roberts’s opinion has been touted as an exemplary piece of judicial
scholarship and a superb act of statesmanship.19 Legal scholars have
celebrated his opinion as a win for bipartisanship and congratulated the
Chief Justice on his ability to turn his back on political influences and
concentrate instead on a restrained interpretation of the Affordable Care
Act.20 He has been lauded for sticking to the law, for demonstrating
impartiality and deference, and for formulating an opinion that shows the
Court can be a place of political and partisan refuge.21 Chief Justice
Roberts has long espoused a dedication to judicial restraint. In his Senate
Confirmation Hearings, Roberts analogized the role of the judge to the role
of an impartial umpire and advocated for restraint, humility, and a limited
judiciary role.22 In Sebelius, Roberts again cited a philosophy of judicial
restraint by explaining that “[m]embers of the Court are vested with the
authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor
prerogative to make policy judgments.”23
However, a careful read of the Sebelius decision shows that Roberts
did not actually practice judicial restraint but judicial activism coupled with
significant policy judgments. Roberts argues the role of the Court is to
“give Congress great latitude in exercising its powers.”24 Yet, it is exactly
19. See Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: “Reasonable Interpretation” and
the Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118–19 (2012) (arguing that Roberts’s
“opinion transcended the polarized political debates surrounding the legal challenge to
President Barack Obama’s signature domestic policy initiative through analytical
convergence, not political compromise”); Brian P. Kane, Everyone Was Right and Everyone
Was Wrong: The Subtle Echoes of the Supreme Court’s Healthcare Reform Decision,
ADVOCATE: OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE IDAHO STATE B., Aug. 2012, at 54, 56 (touting
Roberts’s opinion for its “commitment not only to adhere strictly to the law, but also to
avoid inserting his or the Court’s policy choices” and finding that “his opinion is likely to
become a hallmark of judicial minimalism because of the multiple opportunities that the
Court had to strike broadly, but instead patiently and surgically upheld with minimal
removal”); John K. DiMugno, Navigating Health Care Reform: The Supreme Court’s Ruling
and the Choppy Waters Ahead, 24 No. 6 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1, 1 (2012) (applauding
Roberts’s Sebelius decision for “navigating these [political] currents in a manner that
extricated the Court from a political firestorm that would have threatened the Court’s
legitimacy and institutional standing following a decade of politically-charged rulings
without changing the Court’s conservative trajectory”).
20. See generally Minow, supra note 19; Kane, supra note 19; DiMugno, supra note
19.
21. See generally Minow, supra note 19; Kane, supra note 19; Dimungo, supra note
19.
22. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement by John G. Roberts, Jr.) (basing his
judicial perspective on the “humility [that] should characterize the judicial role.” Arguing
that “[j]udges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge
is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role.”).
23. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
24. Id. (Roberts goes on to adopt the proposition: “‘[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
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this latitude that Roberts denies Congress in Sebelius. As will be
demonstrated below, Roberts could have upheld both the individual
mandate and Medicaid provision under the Commerce Clause and the
power to tax and spend, respectively. His decision to limit both the
Commerce Clause and the Tax and Spend power was not done from a
position of restraint, but from a position of policy, informed by his
subjective experience and political perspective. The Sebelius decision is
not an example of judicial restraint and bipartisanship; instead, it is an
example of judicial activism—illustrative of the partisanship inherent in the
judiciary.
This note will examine judicial restraint and the Sebelius decision
in five parts. First, it will be necessary to explore the history of judicial
restraint and its past and present applications. Second, the note will
distinguish between legal realism and legal formalism and examine the rise
of realism in the Critical Legal Studies Movement. Third, Roberts’s actual
decision and his alleged application of judicial restraint will be investigated.
Fourth, the individual mandate and Medicaid provision will be examined
through the government’s initial arguments to uphold them under the
Commerce Clause and Tax and Spend power respectively, thereby
demonstrating that Roberts could have easily decided in the converse.
Finally, after examining the choices available to Roberts, this note will
explain why his espoused philosophy of restraint was used to do just the
opposite and was actually an example of activism. Through an assessment
of the Sebelius decision, this note argues that judicial restraint is an illusion
and that any judicial decision is inevitably a form of activism, imbued with
the subjective influences and experiences of the judge.
I.

THE PAST AND PRESENT APPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT

Judicial restraint is best categorized as a judicial policy that
provides “a structural relationship between the judiciary and the other
branches of government.”25 It is a policy of judicial review based on
deference and a presumption of constitutionality.26 Under a traditional
restrained perspective, a judge will uphold legislation if there is any way to
do so under the constitutional framework and will only overturn a piece of
legislation when it is clearly unconstitutional or an abuse of constitutional
power.27
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.’” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421
(1819)).
25. Luban, supra note 12, at 450.
26. Id. at 450–51.
27. Id.; Timothy P. O’Neill, Harlan on My Mind: Chief Justice Roberts and the
Affordable Care Act, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 170, 172 (2012).
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Harvard professor James Bradley Thayer promulgated the classical
conception of judicial restraint in 1893.28 Under Thayer’s brand of judicial
restraint, a judge will refrain from striking down a legislative act even if it
was constitutionally incorrect and will only intervene for clear error or
abuse of discretion.29 Thayerism attracted some of the judiciary’s greatest
minds,30 and although its most extreme application has been replaced with
more moderate views of restraint, it is still influential in framing the
discourse about policies of deference and restraint.31
The emergence of Thayerism in the late 19th Century created a
“kind of intellectual Gemeinschaft,” counting among its members Justices
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter as well as
Learned Hand and Yale law professor, Alexander Bickel.32 However, even
beginning with Holmes, who proclaimed his theories to be succinct with
Thayer, Thayerism immediately began to distort and fray around the edges
in the hands of Thayerian judges and professors.33
Thayer not only believed that the legislature was usually right, but
also that the legislative branch creatively and responsibly applied and
considered their constitutional limitations in the creation of law.34 These
beliefs, serving as the basis for pure Thayerian restraint, along with the
difficulty of applying his stringent model of restraint, marked its demise.
With the emergence of competing theories used for deciding difficult
constitutional cases, the validity of Thayer’s approach waned.35 Under a
pure application of Thayer’s model of restraint, a judge would have to
uphold a decision, even if she believed it unconstitutional, unless it was
clearly erroneous and unreasonable.36 With difficult constitutional issues,
Thayerism offered no real guidance and no viable avenue for finding a
statute unconstitutional.37 Thus, in practice, the key members of “The
28. Luban, supra note 12, at 451.
29. O’Neill, supra note 27, at 172.
30. See Luban, supra note 12, at 451 (noting classical restraint theorists such as
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter).
31. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L.
REV. 519, 522, 533 (2012) (explaining that Thayerism “died for a variety of reasons: it
rested on false premises about judicial deliberation; it lacked coherence,” and further noting
that although Thayerism faded away, the ideology of judicial restraint remains, even if it is
only a “vague, all-purpose compliment”).
32. Luban, supra note 12, at 450–51.
33. See Posner, supra note 31, at 522 (finding that Thayerism died because “it lacked
coherence—the Thayerians did not constitute a community of thought; it had no stopping
point—once you embraced it, you could not explain why a law would ever be declared
unconstitutional; it was vulnerable to the rise of constitutional theories; and it was given its
coup de grâce by a combination of decisions by the liberal Warren Court and the refusal of
the conservative successors to Justices of the Warren Court to accept a ratchet theory of
judicial succession.”).
34. Id. at 525.
35. Id. at 535.
36. Id. at 522–23.
37. Id. at 522.
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School of Thayer” interpreted judicial restraint through the lenses of their
personal philosophies and the pure application of Thayer’s model of
judicial restraint faded away.38
Perhaps the last quasi-Thayerian was Justice John Marshall Harlan,
a man Richard Posner identified as the “the last restrained justice.”39
Harlan adopted judicial restraint as a form of humility and a path to
upholding federalism and the separation of powers.40 He believed that
judicial restraint was the best way for a judge to keep his personal beliefs,
politics, and influences in check, and that deference to legislative action
was the key to upholding states’ rights, the political process, and
constitutional clarity.41 Harlan’s philosophy of restraint demonstrates the
influence of Thayer’s model but removes Thayer’s extreme practice of
deference when faced with a complex issue of constitutional law. Although
Harlan believed that judicial restraint was key to an effective and
responsible judiciary, his philosophy did not rely on Thayer’s belief that the
legislature was presumably smarter and wiser nor did he advocate for
Holmes’s soldier-like obedience and deference.42 In practice, Harlan’s
brand of judicial restraint was accomplished through a constant respect for
federalism, separation of powers, and consistent acknowledgment of the
needs, values, and desires of the majority.43
39. See Posner, supra note 31, at 522. Justice Holmes took perhaps the most
influential Thayerist approach, evolving his initial perspective of judicial restraint into an
entirely new legal philosophy and giving birth to Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies
movement, as will be discussed below. See Fuller, supra note 5. Justice Holmes equated a
judge’s position to that of a soldier, one who follows orders regardless of their wisdom and
attempts to constantly keep subjective influences at bay. See Luban, supra note 12, at 489–
90 (citing Holmes’s famous judicial perspective; “‘I always say, as you know, that if my
fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.’”) (quoting Letter from
Oliver W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, at
248–49 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953)). However, as discussed below, his divergence
from Thayerism was rooted in a growing skepticism of the judiciary’s ability to objectively
apply the law. See Scott, supra note 13, at 64.
Bickel and Brandeis also applied their own touches to Thayer’s model of judicial
restraint. See Luban, supra note 12, at 453 (noting how “Bickel, following up on the famous
opinion of Brandeis, advocated the ‘passive virtues’: a strategy of dodging of constitutional
issues by means of jurisdictional devices.”); Posner, supra note 31, at 532 (noting Bickel’s
basis for judicial restraint was grounded in prudence and a belief that restraint was a moral
path to making sure the judiciary did not overly influence the majority).
40. Posner, supra note 31, at 533.
41. See O’Neill, supra note 27, at 179.
42. See generally id.
43. Id. at 180–82 (noting that Harlan’s “‘idea of federalism is, itself, a kind of balance-a way of dividing governmental authority to prevent a too-easy dominance of public life by
a single institution or faction’” (citing Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, Civil
Liberties, and the Warren Court, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 101 (1991)) and further noting
that when Harlan thought a case called for substantial action, he would go far to uphold a
statute, even adding language if need be (referring to Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
44. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 501–02 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with Justices Black and Stewart that judicial restraint will be accomplished by a
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Although Posner might believe Harlan was the last restrained
justice, Chief Justice Roberts attempts to follow in his footsteps. During his
Senate Confirmation Hearings, Justice Roberts adopted Justice Harlan’s
technique of constitutional interpretation, noting specifically Justice
Harlan’s “sensitivity to the limitations on the judicial role.”44 It is Harlan’s
brand of judicial restraint that Roberts identified as most influential to his
own judicial philosophy during his confirmation hearings and what he
attempted to practice in Sebelius.45 Throughout his opinion, Roberts notes
the limited role of the judiciary and the deference that must be given to
legislative action.46 However, as will be illustrated below, this attempt at
judicial restraint was actually a form of judicial activism and evidences the
impossibility of true restraint.
II.

LEGAL FORMALISM VERSUS LEGAL REALISM AND THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT

Regardless of the incongruous adaptations of Thayerism, it
influenced, and perhaps even gave birth to, the dueling philosophies of
legal formalism and legal realism. In Justice Holmes’s divergence from
Thayer’s faith in the legislative branch, he was also skeptical about the
ability of the judiciary to objectively apply the law.47 Although he valued
the practice and philosophy of judicial restraint, Justice Holmes’s
perspective evolved into a belief that the application of law is inescapably
influenced by the subjective elements of human experience.48 In The
Common Law, Holmes stated that “the life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience,” and in that succinct phrase he gave birth to the idea
of legal realism.49 The acknowledgment of the subjective experience in
judicial action created a schism from legal formalism, which was the
dominant view in Holmes’s time, and it is a dichotomy that grounded the

narrow application of due process, limited to the right enumerated in the constitution and
explaining that judicial self-restraint “will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional
areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great
roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing
and preserving American freedoms . . . . Adherence to these principles will not, of course,
obviate all constitutional differences of opinion among judges, nor should it. Their
continued recognition will, however, go farther toward keeping most judges from roaming at
large in the constitutional field than will the interpolation into the Constitution of an artificial
and largely illusory restriction on the content of the Due Process Clause.”).
45. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 22, at 259.
46. See id.; O’Neill, supra note 27, at 171–72.
47. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
48. See Scott, supra note 13, at 64.
49. Id.
50. Id.; Fuller, supra note 5, at 429.
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legal realism movement and remains a sticking point in today’s debates on
judicial philosophy.50
a)

Legal Formalism

Formalism permeated legal scholarship among 19th and early 20th
Century jurists, in which there was a search for and a belief in the “built-in
legal structure of the democracy and the market.”51 This legal structure
provided the policies, rules, and materials that grounded judicial decisionmaking and was rooted in the belief of a “universal legal language.”52 This
philosophy, like judicial restraint, centered on the clear delineation of
responsibility among the branches of government, and mechanically relied
on the idea of the legislature’s role to make laws and the judiciary’s role to
apply them without question or acknowledgment of subjective influence on
the judiciary.53
Formalism is directly linked to judicial restraint. Richard Posner
posits that there are three categories of judicial restraint and the first and
foremost is born from an adoption of legal formalism.54 As Posner
explains, judicial restraint is manifested from the belief that judges merely
apply the law, they do not make it.55 This formalist philosophy was also
illustrated by Roberts himself when he referred to the judge as merely an
51. Scott, supra note 13, at 64 (“[a]ccording to Holmes, the law is informed by
experience. Because experience is subjective, indeterminate, and pragmatic, Holmes’s
position represented a significant departure from the formalist legal philosophy of his
time.”); see also Edgar Bodenheimer, Book Review: Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and
Practice by Karl N. Llewellyn, 41 TEX. L. REV. 609, 609–10 (1963) (explaining that legal
realists focus on “factors outside the positive sources of law which in their opinion are apt to
influence judicial action significantly, such as the personality of the judge, his conscious or
subconscious value preferences, his social philosophy, and his intuitive response to the
totality of the facts in a litigated case.”).
52. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 567 (1983).
53. Id. at 568.
54. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 352–59 (explaining the formalist “idea that the
legitimate legal sovereign, representing the citizenry, should make rules applying to the
various situations in which state coercion might be used. Judges should then apply those
rules, acting as agents of the sovereign.”) (emphasis in the original) (Kennedy goes on to
explain that the nature of rule application was thought to be mechanical. “[The judge] must
never ask whether giving this particular response, in light of the total situation including but
not limited to the per se elements, is best”) (emphasis in the original).
55. See Posner, supra note 31, at 520–21 (explaining the three categories of restraint
as “(1) judges apply law, they don’t make it (call this ‘legalism’—though ‘formalism’ is the
commoner name—or, better, ‘the law made me do it’); (2) judges defer to a very great extent
to decisions by other officials—appellate judges defer to trial judges and administrative
agencies, and all judges to legislative and executive decisions (call this ‘modesty,’ or
‘institutional competence,’ or ‘process jurisprudence’); (3) judges are highly reluctant to
declare legislative or executive action unconstitutional—deference is at its zenith when
action is challenged as unconstitutional (call this ‘constitutional restraint’)”).
56. Id.
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umpire; a figure limited to interpreting the law and never imposing on the
game itself.56 As Duncan Kennedy explains, the formalists believe that
“[r]ule application, in sharp contrast, involves the objective or ‘cognitive’
operation of identifying particular factual aspects of situations followed by
the execution of unambiguous prescriptions for official action. In short,
according to the theory of formality, it is inherently certain and
predictable.”57 This belief in certainty and predictability is the basis for
judicial restraint due to the belief that the more limited and deferential the
judiciary, the more objective and foreseeable their actions.58 Formalism
suggests that the law can be determined on objective facts and, thus, the
judiciary need not ever question the wisdom of the law, only whether it fits
within the constraints of the Constitution.59
This formalistic judicial philosophy gave birth to the idea of the
judge as a herculean figure, one composed of staunch judicial restraint and
deference, demonstrating steadfast commitment to “intellectual
disinterestedness.”60 As Robert Ferguson explained, such a philosophy
promulgated the idea that “[j]udges are in but not of the world.”61
Perhaps the most readily identifiable formalist is Justice Antonin
Scalia. Justice Scalia is an originalist in his constitutional interpretation and
a textualist in his statutory interpretation,62 perspectives he believes lend
themselves to proper formalistic strategy.63 Scalia expressed the idea that
adhesion to form and clear, readily applicable rules is the only way for the
judiciary to make “as little law as possible.”64 For Scalia, formalism is the
identification and application of a general rule above all else. These rules
are pulled strictly from the Congress or the Constitution, and where there is
ambiguity, it is the job of the judiciary to use the proper legal materials to
identify “some precise, principled content.”65 Through the identification
and application of general legal rules, Scalia believes the judiciary gets
closer to the ultimate goal of predictability.66 In order to avoid “protracted
uncertainty” and achieve predictability, “there are times when even a bad
rule is better than no rule at all.”67
57. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 22, at 55.
58. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 364 (emphasis in the original).
59. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 435–37 (noting that traditionalist judicial philosophy
values a restrained judiciary that bases its decisions on the technical aspects of the law
because such an approach leads to greater predictability).
60. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 359.
61. Ferguson, supra note 8, at 511–13.
62. Id. at 515.
62. Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 Emory L.J. 1195,
1250 (2009).
63. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989).
64. Id. at 1179.
65. Id. at 1182–83.
66. Scalia, supra note 63, at 1179.
67. Id. at 1179.
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More than even judicial restraint, Scalia urges judicial constraint.
He argues that by adopting general rules the Court not only constrains its
decisions to those rules but implements constraints on the lower courts.68
He further argues that although other interpretative philosophies do not
preclude an adherence to formalism, his originalist and textualist
perspectives are especially well-suited to the judiciary’s formulaic task.69
By adhering to the “plain meaning of the text” and the original meaning of
the Constitution, Scalia finds a basis for constraint and a better-suited
perspective for identifying and limiting a case to the general rule of law.70
Scalia’s promotion of judicial constraint, adherence to generally acceptable
and recognizable rules of law, and the pursuit of predictability through such
constraints are the cornerstones of formalism and the converse of these
ideals provide the basis for understanding realism.
Legal formalism is directly opposed to legal realism. Formalism
originates in a basic, simplified, division of labor between law-maker (the
legislature) and law application (the judiciary).71 Formalists recognize a set
of principles, methodology, policies, and other tools given to the rule
appliers by the rule makers, and any decision either encapsulates those
principles and policies or has nothing to do with them.72 Through this labor
division, formalism creates a judicial philosophy that is divorced from the
sociological, ideological, philosophical, or psychological.73 It creates a
limited and narrow jurisprudence that applies impersonal, objective
principles and policies, and does not allow for any outside subjective
influence.74 Any ideological manifestation is left to the law-maker and the
law-applier is limited to the rules, procedure, and policy explicitly
guaranteed in the constitution or by statute.75
b) Legal Realism
Legal realism attempts to buck the yoke of traditional, formulaic
jurisprudence, by demonstrating that judicial predictability is virtually
impossible. Realists posit that predictability is only possible by embracing
the subjectivity of judicial action. First, it is impossible to achieve any
68. Id. at 1179–80.
69. Id. at 1184.
70. Id. (advocating for an “adherence to a more or less originalist theory of
construction. The raw material for the general rule is readily apparent. If a barn was not
considered the curtilage of a house in 1791 or 1868 and the Fourth Amendment did not
cover it, then unlawful entry into a barn today may be a trespass, but not an unconstitutional
search and seizure.”).
71. See Posner, supra note 31, at 520 (basing formalism on the theory of a division of
labor in which the legislature makes the law and the judiciary only interprets it).
72. See, Kennedy, supra note 7, at 364 (explaining that formalistic rule application is
based solely on objective and cognitive facts and laws).
73. See generally, Kennedy, supra note 7, at 364; Fuller, supra note 5, at 434–35.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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predictability when one ignores relevant factors that influence judicial
action.76 Hemming judges into traditional methods of analysis not only
makes it impossible to guess when they will circumvent such rigidity, but it
also makes it difficult to create a valid forum of discourse when scholars
voluntary accept the blindfold of formulism and ignore all glimpses of nontraditional analysis.77 As Roberto Unger explains, there is perpetual
“indeterminacy through generalization.”78
Legal realism strives to change the traditional philosophy of
formalism by creating a more authentic view of the judiciary and the
personal abilities of judges themselves. Realists acknowledge that judges
do indeed make law, and they do so not only with the materials of
procedure, structure, and rules provided by statute and constitutional
provisions, but also through the “situation around and before them.”79 Karl
Llewellyn, one of the key founders of legal realism, has often noted that
realism is not a school or movement; it does not embody one concise
theory.80 It is instead a philosophical approach with diverging branches;
some more extreme than others. Yet, all branches of realism base their
philosophy on a few common, key principles, as identified by Llewellyn.81
Two such principles are the acceptance that elements outside of
procedure and rules influence judicial action82 and the acknowledgment of
the aggregation of judicial theory and the social sciences.83 Legal realists
reject a functional, universal legal perspective that judges could and should
decide cases strictly on the rules and traditional materials available to them
and adopt the more inclusive view of the social sciences. Justice Holmes
originally formulated this idea by distinguishing logic from experience.84
Justice Holmes believed the law does not develop based strictly on
objective factors such as procedure, facts, and precedent, but is also shaped
and manifested by the individual experience of the judge.85 His position,
distinguishing objective logic from subjective experience, began the entire

76. Fuller, supra note 5, at 437.
77. Id.
78. Unger, supra note 51, at 569.
80. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1296.
81. See Bodenheimer, supra note 50, at 609; Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1233 (1931) [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Some Realism].
82. See Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 80, at 1235–38 (explaining the various
categories of legal realism philosophy that tie the theory together).
83. See Bodenheimer, supra note 50, at 609; Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 80,
at 1237.
84. See Pound, supra note 9, at 785–86 (touting the important of social science and
social psychology on legal scholarship, stating that “[s]ociological jurists, as part of their
insistence on unification of the social sciences, have for a generation emphasized the place
of social psychology in their program.”).
85. See Holmes, supra note 6, at 1.
86. See Scott, supra note 13, at 64.

2015]

THE GREAT TACTICIAN

161

realist movement, which acknowledged the impossibility of true objectivity
and embraced the implicit subjectivity within analysis.86
From these two key concepts of realism emerged both extreme and
moderate viewpoints, with Llewellyn leading the side of the moderates.
One of the crucial debates between moderates and extremists is the
approach to legal uncertainty. Legal formalism’s main goals were to create
judicial certainty, predictability, and the basic rules that provide for both.87
Legal realism, in both its extreme and moderate branches, works to subvert
this strategy. Roscoe Pound, who founded the most extreme form of legal
realism, “conceives of each item of the judicial process as shaped wholly
and inexorably by the psychological determinations of the behavior of the
individual judge.”88 For moderate realists, legal certainty is not an
impossibility, but can only be achieved by acknowledging the effects of
psychology and culture on judicial action.89
c)

The Critical Legal Studies Movement

The Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) movement developed from the
many branches of realistic, leftist modern thought with scholars Roberto
Unger and Duncan Kennedy in the vanguard.90 Critical Legal Studies is
often seen as an answer to those judges who espouse judicial restraint and
deference “as code words for the personal intellectual rigor of the judge
who, it is presumed, remains aloof while deciding a case.”91 The CLS
movement disavows such judicial assertions by finding that the “‘law is
simply politics by other means’ and that legal reasoning is a myth.”92
Roberto Unger has identified two facets of the CLS movement. The first
focuses on the view that legal doctrine is an illustration of one’s vision of
society, which embodies and demonstrates the suppressive and
manipulative character of such a doctrine.93 The second idea, which Unger
notes has decreased in popularity, is the view that legal doctrines reinforce
and sustain social hierarchy and divisions.94
The CLS movement is a voice speaking loudly against formalism,
and it purports to cast judicial action completely outside the realm of
predictability and adherence to legal norms and methods.95 It admonishes
traditional formalism for ignoring the influence of the market, social
87. See id.; see also Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr., Legal Realism, Sociological
Jurisprudence and Mr. Justice Holmes, 26 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 547, 548–49 (1965).
88. See Scalia, supra note 63, at 1179.
89. Pound, supra note 9, at 787.
90. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 437.
91. Unger, supra note 51, at 564.
92. Ferguson, supra note 8, at 513.
93. Id. (citing David Kairys, ed., THE POLITICS OF LAW, n.14 (1982)).
94. Unger, supra note 51, at n.1.
95. Id.
96. See generally id. at 673–76.
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science, philosophy, and psychology, and advocates for a judicial
perspective that takes into account the influence of cultural and societal
factors on judicial action.96 Many CLS scholars believe that recognizing
the inevitable subjective influences on judicial decision-making not only
brings predictability one step closer, but also serves to subvert social
hierarchy and division.97
Although critics of CLS, and legal realism in general, argue that
they fail to assist the judiciary in making any distinctions between proper
and improper basis for judgment,98 advocates praise these theories for their
candor in recognizing the shortcomings of traditional judicial legal theory.
All branches of realism not only show the stifling limitations of strict
formalism, they offer the possibility of other options in thought, process,
and action.99 Realism’s purpose, and one it shares with Critical Legal
Studies, is to “discredit, once and for all, the conception of a system of
social types with a built-in institutional structure.”100
The remainder of this paper seeks to demonstrate the fallibility of a
system that relies on one institutional structure. Such fallibility is
demonstrated by the belief there is a difference between judicial activism
and judicial restraint, and the unfortunate, antiquated assumption that the
judiciary’s saving grace is in the latter.101 Formalistic judicial theories are
used to reconcile a dichotomy of correctness that does not exist and that
willfully turns a blind eye to substantive theories of politics and rights.102
In the search for one right answer, be it a case or judicial philosophy,
traditional formalism shines a light on its own weakness.103 Consequently,
it is through adherence to this weakness that the system remains mired in
partisanship.104

97. Id.
98. Id. at 674–75 (“When we came, they were like a priesthood that had lost their faith
and kept their jobs. They stood in tedious embarrassment before cold altars. But we turned
away from those altars, and found the mind’s opportunity in the heart’s revenge.”).
99. Bodenheimer, supra note 50, at 612.
100. See Unger, supra note 51, at 577 (“The disintegration of such theories, which has
been the dominant feature of recent social thought, creates an opportunity for normative and
programmatic ideas . . .”).
101. Id. at 570.
102. Id. at 572.
103. Id. at 573 (explaining that attempting to rescue doctrines from valid critiques are
“makeshift apologies”); see also Fuller, supra note 5, at 435 (referring to the tortured
practice of reconciling particular theoretical legal doctrines with the practical law judges
must apply which ultimately ignores essential humanitarian considerations).
104. See Unger, supra note 51, at 573; Fuller, supra note 5, at 435.
105. See generally Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 401 (demonstrating the
seemingly polar results one gets when applying varying theories on the canons of
construction).
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THE SEBELIUS DECISION AND CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S
RELIANCE ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

Chief Justice John Roberts’s judicial philosophy is rooted in
judicial restraint. During his 2005 Senate Confirmation Hearings, Roberts
responded to Vice President (then-Senator) Biden that an appropriate
judicial perspective revolved around a practice of “judicial humility” which
gives due deference to precedent and the separation of powers.105 Roberts
further grounded his judicial perspective in the belief that judges are “not
individuals promoting their own particular views, but they are supposed to
be doing their best to interpret the law, to interpret the Constitution,
according to the rule of law, not their own preferences, not their own
personal beliefs. That’s the ideal.”106
Roberts further embraced judicial restraint as the basis for his
decision in Sebelius. Roberts explained that the Court’s approach should
demonstrate a “general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s
elected leaders,” and the actions of the legislature should only be struck
down when an act clearly oversteps the legislature’s constitutional
power.107 Roberts explained that judicial restraint is rooted in the very
nature of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature by
emphasizing that “members of this Court are vested with the authority to
interpret law,” not the power to make law or policy judgments.108 Judicial
restraint, according to the Roberts, is crucial to the separation of powers
because it is the legislature and not the judiciary that bears the burden of
making law and policy.109 Additionally, Roberts acknowledged that only
the legislature is voted for by the people and, thus, speaks with the voice of
the people.110 Due to that relationship and the power that must be retained
by the people, Roberts clarified that it is not the Court’s job to “protect
people from the consequences of their political choices.”111 Roberts
emphasized that the role of the Court is to uphold the will of the people
whenever possible, regardless of the wisdom of their choices, as long as
such laws and policies can be found constitutional.112
It is with this philosophy of judicial restraint that Roberts ostensibly
interpreted the Affordable Care Act. Throughout the Sebelius decision,
Roberts grounded his analysis in judicial deference to Congress.113 He
argued a legislative act should be upheld as long as the act is within the

106. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 22, at 55.
107. Id. at 205.
108. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
114. See id.
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bounds of the Constitution, and114 that “‘every reasonable construction [of
an act] must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.’”115 Through this philosophy and deference, Roberts
analyzed the constitutionality of both the individual mandate and the
Medicaid provision.
a)
Chief Justice Roberts declined to find the individual mandate a
valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power.
Under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the individual mandate
states all “applicable individuals” shall maintain minimum health
insurance.116 A penalty fee will be assessed to any such individual who
fails to maintain minimum health insurance coverage, which is to be paid
with their tax return.117 In Sebelius, the government argued that the
individual mandate should be upheld under the Commerce Clause and if
not, then alternatively under Congress’s power to tax and spend.118
Roberts, along with four other conservative justices,119 disagreed that the
individual mandate was a valid exercise of the congressional commerce
power.120 However, basing his analysis on the principles of judicial
restraint, Roberts found the penalty is a tax and upheld the individual
mandate as constitutional per the Tax and Spend Clause.121
Chief Justice Roberts found the individual mandate exceeded
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.122 Roberts identified the
difference between regulating commerce and compelling commerce and
found Congress had no power to force individuals into the market.123
Roberts likened the insurance mandate to a congressional directive to
115. Id. at 2594 (“[t]he question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of
the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
116. Id. (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
117. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2014); see § 5000A(d) (defining “applicable individuals”
as all individuals except those meeting an exemption per § 5000A(d)(2)–(4) and (e)
including but not limited to those individuals meeting the religious conscience and health
care sharing ministry exemptions, incarcerated individuals, those who are not legally present
in the country, and those not meeting the minimum income to bear the penalty).
118. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1)–(2).
119. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2584.
120. See id. at 2642–47 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion was
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito).
121. Id. at 2591, 2644; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Commerce Clause
reads as follow: “Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
122. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (The Tax and
Spend Clause reads as follows: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States.”).
123. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
124. Id. at 2589.
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Americans to buy more vegetables and noted that allowing the government
to affect the market in such a way would authorize Congress to compel
behavior under the Commerce Clause in a manner the framers never
intended.124
Chief Justice Roberts distinguished the individual mandate from the
Agriculture Adjustment Act’s wheat quotas in Wickard v. Fillburn,
whereby the Court upheld a federal penalty against a wheat farmer for
growing beyond his quota for personal consumption.125 Even though the
Act compelled the farmer to participate in the market by purchasing wheat
for personal use as opposed to growing it, Roberts found such compulsion
was distinguishable from the individual mandate because the farmer was
already part of the wheat market.126 Roberts reasoned that unlike the farmer
in Wickard, individuals are not continuously “active in the market for health
care.”127 Although the government argued all individuals are active in the
healthcare market because they will require healthcare services at some
point in their lives, Roberts equated this reasoning to the purchase of an
automobile.128 He argued that even though an individual bought a car two
years ago and is likely to buy a car again in the future, such a presumption
does not make that individual active in the automobile market in the
interim.129
With this analysis, Roberts found the individual mandate exceeded
Congress’s grant of power under the Commerce Clause and, thus, placed a
firm limitation on the scope of that power.130 Roberts feared that allowing
Congress to compel activity through the Commerce Clause would create a
125. Id. at 2588–89.
126. Id. at 2587–88; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 113–115, 124–25, 130
(1942) (In this case, the appellee farmer argued that the marketing penalty assessed under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (“AAA”) was unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause. The farmer harvested 11.9 acres of wheat, much of which was to be
used for personal consumption and the feeding of livestock, but the wheat quota instituted by
the AAA was set at 11.1 acres. Even though the farmer’s excess harvest was minimal and
for personal use, the Court found that Congress had the right under the Commerce Clause to
regulate such consumption. The Court explained the breadth of the Commerce Clause,
holding that Congress’ commerce power “may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.” The Court
further distinguished between direct and indirect commercial activity and found that “even if
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”).
127. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2588.
128. Id. at 2589–90.
129. Id. at 2590.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2591; see also Minow, supra note 19, at 140 (discussing the Commerce
Clause limitations created by the Sebelius decision and noting that Roberts addressed the
“parade of horribles” that could come to pass by allowing Congress such a broad scope of
power under the Commerce Clause, including the power to compel purchases of an
unlimited number of products from broccoli to automobiles).
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slippery slope allowing congressional mandates to purchase almost any
product from broccoli to automobiles.131 Roberts further found that because
the individual mandate was not a valid exercise of commerce power, it was
also beyond the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.132
However, Roberts did not end his analysis with the Commerce or
Necessary and Proper Clauses, but looked to whether the individual
mandate could be upheld under the power to tax and spend. Chief Justice
Roberts, siding with the four liberal justices, found that the mandated
penalty was a tax.133 Roberts found the penalty could be interpreted as a
tax, regardless of the fact that it was explicably termed a penalty under the
ACA.134 Roberts explained that the “question is not whether that is the
most natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly
possible’ one.”135
Roberts sided with the government’s alternative argument and
found the penalty to be a tax for several reasons. First, the amount assessed
is less than the cost of insurance and, thus, individuals may decide to pay
the penalty as opposed to securing minimal coverage.136 Second, the
penalty does not contain a scienter element. In other words, the ACA is not
attempting to punish bad behavior through the assessment of the penalty.137
Finally, the penalty is paid to the IRS when payors submit their taxes, and
the penalty is assessed in the same manner as taxes, namely through
calculations based on taxable income, number of dependents per household,
and joint filing status.138
Roberts found that the individual mandate is a constitutional
exercise of the taxing power because it does not create “any new federal
power,” unlike allowing Congress to regulate inactivity under the
Commerce Clause.139 In doing so, Roberts relied on Justice Holmes, citing
the proposition that “as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by
one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain
duty is to adopt that which will save the Act,”140 Roberts noted “taxes that
132. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
133. Id. at 2593 (“Just as the individual mandate cannot be sustained as a law regulating
the substantial effects of the failure to purchase health insurance, neither can it be upheld as
a ‘necessary and proper’ component of the insurance reforms. The commerce power thus
does not authorize the mandate.”).
134. Id. at 2598; see also id. at 2575 (noting that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan joined the opinion as to Parts I, II, and III-C and that Justice Ginsburg filed an
opinion in respect to Parts III-A, III-B, and III-D concurring and dissenting in part, joined by
Justice Sotomayor and Justices Breyer and Kagan in Parts I, II, III, and IV).
135. Id. at 2594–95.
136. Id. at 2594.
137. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594
138. Id. at 2595–96.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2599.
141. Id. at 2593 (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.
concurring opinion)).
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seek to influence conduct are nothing new” and upheld the individual
mandate as a valid exercise of the congressional power to tax and spend.141
b)
Chief Justice Roberts declined to find the Medicaid provision a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to tax and spend.
Although the individual mandate was upheld under the power to tax
and spend, the ACA’s Medicaid provision was not so fortunate. The ACA
expanded the Medicaid program by compelling states to increase the
number of covered individuals.142 By 2014, the ACA required states to
expand Medicaid to cover adults with incomes up to 133 percent of the
federal poverty level.143 The ACA would increase a state’s federal funding
to assist in covering the Medicaid expansion, but it also allowed the
government to remove all of the state’s Medicaid funding should the state
fail to adhere to the Medicaid provision.144
Chief Justice Roberts examined the Medicaid provision under
Congress’s power to tax and spend. Although Congress has the power to
influence state action through the Tax and Spend Clause, Roberts noted that
states must not be coerced or forced into such behavior.145 He explained
that states must have “a legitimate choice whether to accept the federal
conditions in exchange for federal funds.”146 Roberts proposed a test for
determining the constitutional scope of the tax and spend power which
asked whether the financial inducement was “‘so coercive as to pass the
point at which pressure turns into compulsion.’”147
Roberts applied this test and found the Medicaid provision was not
a simple financial inducement but was more akin to a “gun to the head.”148
Roberts distinguished the Medicaid provision from the threatened budget
cuts in South Dakota v. Dole.149 In Dole, the Court found a threat to
withhold 5 percent of a state’s federal highway funds if it did not raise the
drinking age to twenty-one was not coercive, because it would potentially
affect less than half of 1 percent of the state’s overall budget.150 Roberts
noted that the small percentage of affected funds gave South Dakota a real
option in deciding whether or not to comply.151 In contrast, the Medicaid
provision could potentially affect over twenty percent of a state’s overall

142. Id. at 2596–98, 2601.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c.
146. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601.
147. Id. at 2602–03.
148. Id. at 2604 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2604–05.
151. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12.
152. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
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budget, and Roberts found the threat of losing such a large amount of
funding removed any real choice from the states.152
Roberts raised further issue with the Medicaid provision, finding
that in practice it turned the existing Medicaid program into “a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.”153 He took issue with this concept because Congress cannot
surprise the states with imposed conditions on preexisting programs or
condition the grant of federal funds ambiguously.154 Even though the
Medicaid program clearly allows the federal government to alter the
program and the requirements for the disbursements of funds at any time,
Roberts reasoned that such a drastic change as embodied in the ACA was
beyond the scope of reasonable anticipation.155 Because the Medicaid
expansion “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely in degree,” Roberts
agreed with the four conservative justices and struck down the provision as
unconstitutional.156 However, Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with Justice
Scalia that the Medicaid provision could not be severed and, thus, upheld
the rest of the ACA.157
Even though Roberts upheld the rest of the ACA, his determination
that the Medicaid provision exceeded Congress’s powers to tax and spend
instituted a limitation on congressional powers which had never before been
imposed.158 He again tipped his hat to judicial restraint in upholding the
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2606.
155. Id. at 2605.
156. Id. at 2605–06.
157. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607, 2666.
158. Id. at 2607 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) includes a severability clause and thus
interprets congressional intent to uphold the rest of the Act even though a portion of the Act
might be struck down).
159. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting “for the first time ever—[the Court]
finds an exercise of Congress’ spending power unconstitutionally coercive”) (emphasis in
the original).
The scope of the power to tax and spend is set forth in Dole, in which the Court
explained that any exercise of such power must be (1) for the general welfare of the people;
(2) done so unambiguously so as to give the States notice of what they are agreeing to and
allow them to make an intelligent and informed decision; (3) connected to the federal
interest inherent to the federal program in question; and (4) must only induce state action
that is itself constitutional. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). In Pennhurst
State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, the Court further examined the requirement that
conditions be unambiguous and set limitations on the power to tax and spend. 451 U.S. 1
(1981). In that case, residents of an institution for the mentally disabled complained that the
state-run and federally-funded hospital did not adhere to the requirements of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, specifically the provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 6010 which stated that treatment “should be provided in the setting that is least
restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.” Id. at 13. The Court disagreed because it found
that the provisions of § 6010 were not clearly mandatory upon the states and were not
expressly set forth as requirements prior to the states’ acceptance of federal funds. Id. at 25.
The Court held that the Act could not compel state action because it did not expressly
include the provisions of § 6010 as conditional upon state compliance. Id. The section in
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remaining ACA by noting the “‘touchstone for any decision about remedy
is legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to
circumvent the intent of legislature.’”159 Yet, under the umbrella of judicial
restraint, Chief Justice Roberts imposed novel limitations on congressional
powers at every opportunity, placing brakes on both the Commerce Clause
and Tax and Spend Clause for future applications.

question was easily differentiated from the other provisions of the Act, which set forth how
funds should be allotted to the states and what the states must do in order to receive such
funds. Id. at 13. The Court explained that “Congress must express clearly its intent to impose
conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or
not to accept those funds . . . The crucial inquiry, however, is not whether a State would
knowingly undertake that obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can
fairly say that the State could make an informed choice.” Id. at 24–25.
In Dole, the Court hinted at a fifth requirement, and one on which Justice Roberts
relies heavily, namely that federal action must not be so coercive as to deprive a state of any
real choice. Dole, 483 U.S. at 2798. However, as Justice Ginsburg explains in Sebelius, that
requirement has not been the basis for subsequent limitations on the tax and spend clause.
132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that prior to the Sebelius decision “the
Court has never ruled that the terms of any grant crossed the indistinct line between
temptation and coercion.”); see Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (1989) (finding that
“[t]he coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law,
and never in favor of the challenging party” due to the rules elusiveness); Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that “although there may be some
limit to the terms Congress may impose, we have been unable to uncover any instance in
which a court has invalidated a funding condition.”).
Therefore, it is curious why Justice Roberts, under the guise of judicial restraint,
chose to place such a limitation when both Dole and Pennhurst, when read together, seem to
provide a thorough explanation of the limitations on Congress’s power to tax and spend.
That limitation is rooted in a lack of express, conditional terms made clear prior to the
acceptance of federal funds. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25. Without the presence of such
ambiguity, the Court is reticent to knock down an act of Congress. See Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (finding that a congressional decision will not be overturned
“unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, [and] not an exercise of
judgment.”); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936) (holding that the Court will only
invalidate an act of Congress when there is a “showing that by no reasonable possibility can
the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress.
How great is the extent of that range, when the subject is the promotion of the general
welfare of the United States, we need hardly remark.”).
In practice, the limitations on Congress’s power to tax and spend will only be
found where, as in Pennhurst, a condition is not set out clearly and unambiguously as a
requirement for federal funds “at the time the State receives and uses the money.” Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). As will be explained below, the Medicaid
provision could easily pass under this bar because not only is the acceptance of Medicaid
funds expressly conditioned on the acceptance that Congress can amend Medicaid at any
time and in any way necessary to achieve its purpose, but the ACA itself clearly sets forth its
requirements and conditions in a manner as to give the states several years to decide whether
they will comply or decline to participate. See id. at 2637–38 (Ginsburg, J. concurring).
160. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng.,
46 U.S. 320, 330 (2006)).
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IV. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S JUDICIAL ACTIVISM DISGUISED AS
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Although Chief Justice Roberts allegedly modeled the Sebelius
decision on a philosophy of judicial restraint, an examination of both the
individual mandate and Medicaid provision proves otherwise. Both the
individual mandate and Medicaid provision could have easily been upheld
under the Commerce Clause and the power to tax and spend, respectively.
Adopting a philosophy of judicial restraint, Roberts argued the Court
should adhere to a “general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s
elected leaders” and should only do so when Congress lacks clear
constitutional authority to so act.160 This note argues true judicial restraint
is impossible and, additionally, there are no clear, objective right and wrong
answers in complicated issues of law and policy. The Sebelius decision
evidences the impossibility of true restraint because in every judgment there
can be found some amount of activism and some modicum of subjectivity.
As will be demonstrated below, the individual mandate and Medicaid
provision can both be found constitutional under the government’s initial
arguments, namely the Commerce Clause and the Tax and Spend Clause.
Thus, a truly restrained opinion would find the individual mandate and
Medicaid provision constitutional, all the while demonstrating a reticence to
invalidate either provision or place novel limitations on legislative action.
That reticence is absent in the Sebelius decision even though Roberts and
various other scholars have promoted the opinion as one rooted in
restraint.161 Such restraint, although much discussed, is rarely practiced,
and the resulting opinion, influenced by Roberts’s position, policy and
moral perspective, and political vantage point, evidences the inevitability of
judicial activism.
a)
The Individual Mandate can be interpreted as a constitutional
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause is
limited, retrogressive, and unsupported by recent Commerce Clause
precedent.162 A modern application of Commerce Clause precedent

161. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (emphasis added).
162. See id. (Justice Roberts advocating and adopting a philosophy of restraint); see
also Minow, supra note 19, at 118–19; Kane, supra note 19, at 56; DiMugno, supra note 19,
at 1.
163. Although his opinion may be one correct interpretation of the Commerce Clause
power, it is curious that Roberts would take such a bold step when Congress’s actions could
so easily be interpreted as a normal application of modern Commerce Clause power; see
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding that “[t]his rigid reading of
the [Commerce] Clause makes scant sense and is stunningly retrogressive” and explaining
that the Chief Justice’s “crabbed reading of the Commerce Clause harks back to the era in
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demonstrates the individual mandate could be found constitutional under
the Commerce Clause. In order to decipher the modern precedent defining
the scope of the Commerce Clause, it is helpful to examine a brief history
of its application.
Modern Commerce Clause interpretation begins with an analysis of
the Court’s decision in United States v. Darby, which overturned the
limiting holding of Hammer v. Dagenhart.163 In Hammer, the Court found
the Child Labor Law, which prohibited the sale of goods manufactured by
children under the age of fourteen, was beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause.164 The Court held the Commerce Clause is limited to the interstate
transportation of goods, not their manufacture, and the “production of
articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation.”165
In 1941, the Court overturned this limited application of the Commerce
Clause, and found that Congress had the power to regulate interstate and
intrastate activity when it was “so related to commerce and so affects it as
to be within the reach of the power of Congress to regulate it.”166
In 1942, the Court continued to expand the scope of the Commerce
Clause. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court found the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, which penalized a farmer for growing wheat for personal
use above the allotted quota, was within the scope of the Commerce
Clause.167 The Court explained, “even if appellee’s activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce.”168 The Court went on to emphasize that the scope of
congressional power is valid “irrespective of whether such effect is what
might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”169
As recently as 2005, the Court continued to give broad latitude to
the Commerce Clause. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court found the
Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) could regulate homegrown, localized
marijuana, which had been legitimized through the Compassionate Care
which the Court routinely thwarted Congress’s efforts to regulate the national economy in
the interest of those who labor to sustain it.”).
164. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
165. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918).
166. See id. (finding “[t]he making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce,
nor does the fact that these things are to be afterwards shipped, or used in interstate
commerce, make their production a part thereof”).
167. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115, 117 (finding that the Fair Labor Standards Act was a
valid exercise of the Commerce Clause because “[w]hatever their motive and purpose,
regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within
the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. Subject only to that
limitation, presently to be considered, we conclude that the prohibition of the shipment
interstate of goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the
constitutional authority of Congress.”).
168. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Act.170 The Court emphasized that the scope of Commerce Clause
applicability was based on the substantial relation of the act in question to
interstate commerce.171 The Court clarified that Congress had never been
required to prove a “scientific exactitude,” but rather must only prove that
the “total incidence” of an act “poses a threat to the national market.”
When such a substantial effect is established, Congress “may regulate the
entire class.”172
Although the Court reemphasized the broad scope of the
Commerce Clause in Raich, it had taken historic steps several years earlier
in both United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison to define the
limitations of Congress’s commerce power.173 In Lopez, the Court set forth
three categories of Commerce Clause power. The first category involves
the regulation of interstate economic activity; the second includes any
instrumentalities, persons, or things in interstate commerce, even if the
actions in question resulted from only intrastate activity; and finally, the
third category encapsulates the power to regulate any activities that have a
“substantial relationship to interstate commerce.”174 However, the Court
stated that the “substantially affects” criteria does not allow for piling
“inference upon inference,” and the Commerce Clause power is limited to
those subjects that directly link and directly affect commerce.175 In
Morrison, the Court upheld this limitation, demanding a concrete economic
171. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. The Court in Raich distinguished the CSA from both the legislative acts in Lopez
and Morrison through its regulation of activity that was chiefly economical in nature. See id.
at 25–26 (distinguishing the CSA by explaining that “[u]nlike those [Acts] at issue in Lopez
and Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic”). In
United States v. Lopez, the Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it
a federal offense to possess a firearm within a school zone, was beyond the scope of
Congress’s commerce power because it was regulating activity that did not “substantially
affect interstate commerce” but was in fact a criminal statute and not an “essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity.” See 514 U.S. 549, 560–61 (1995). In United States
v. Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women Act because Congress’s
provision of a civil remedy for gender-motivated violence did not substantially affect
interstate commerce. 529 U.S. 598, 613–14 (2000).
These cases can be distinguished from Raich based on the “substantially affects”
test employed in all three cases. See 545 U.S. at 25–26; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614; Lopez,
514 U.S. at 560. In Raich, the Court found that the regulation of marijuana growth and
distribution substantially affected interstate commerce, whereas the legislative acts in Lopez
and Morrison were not reasonably linked to economic activity. 545 U.S. at 38–39.
However, the Court went even farther and explained that the scope of Congress’s commerce
power is not only that activity which substantially affects interstate commerce, it is any
activity, be it local and even noneconomic, so long as that regulation “is a necessary part of a
more general regulation of interstate commerce . . . the relevant question is simply whether
the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the
commerce power.” Id. at 37 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)).
175. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
176. Id. at 567.
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link to any regulated activity.176 The Court found such a link crucial to
upholding federalism and the constitutional distinction between what is
“truly national and what is truly local.”177
However, even with these limitations, the Court has applied the
“substantially affects” criteria broadly.178 The Court in Raich emphasized
the scope of the commerce power when it held Congress could regulate any
activity that “is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate
commerce” as long as “the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”179 As Justice
Ginsburg explained in her Sebelius concurrence, and as the preceding cases
illustrate, there are two principles of Commerce Clause interpretation.
First, Congress has the power to regulate any area that substantially affects
interstate commerce, and second, the Court provides a great deal of
deference and latitude to congressional action regulating economic and
social activity.180 With these principles in mind, the individual mandate,
which substantially affects the interstate healthcare market, could easily fall
within the scope of Congress’s commerce power. In light of these
principles, it is curious why Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of the
individual mandate was so stringent. Such an interpretation seems
antithetical to principles of deference and restraint, regardless of a
distinction between activity and inactivity.
The majority in Sebelius spent a great deal of time discussing the
distinction between activity and inactivity. They found Congress does not
have the power to regulate economic inactivity or to propel consumers into
the market.181 This holding is justified through the same automobile and
vegetable analogy, namely that although an individual is likely to buy a
new car or broccoli at some point in their life, the government does not
have a right to mandate or regulate possible future purchases.182 The
reliance on activity versus inactivity is flawed for several reasons.
Primarily, the Court has never distinguished between activity and
inactivity. The Court, instead, has implied the opposite by affirming
legislative regulation of future activity and the use of the Commerce Clause
to propel individuals into the market. In Wickard, the Court upheld the
penalty because it found the legislature had a valid interest in protecting the
wheat market and stimulating trade.183 It allowed the penalty for the
primary purpose of discouraging private crop cultivation and propelling
farmers into the wheat market.184 In Raich, the Court upheld congressional
177. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
178. Id. at 617–18.
179. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578–79 (2012).
180. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 121).
181. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 2590–91 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at 2591.
184. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
185. Id.
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action that regulated possible future activity. The Controlled Substance Act
assumed local marijuana growers cultivating crops under California’s
Compassionate Care Act would inevitably flood the interstate market and,
thus, the government had the right to preemptively regulate and penalize
such cultivation.185
Further, the individual mandate relies upon action that is inevitable
and involves a market in which practically every American is already
engaged. The healthcare market is vastly different from the automobile
industry or vegetable marketplace. As Justice Ginsburg explained,
although most Americans purchase automobiles and broccoli within the
course of their lives, such purchases are in no way absolute or inevitable.186
Not all Americans drive, and there is surely a fair constituency of
Americans who are averse to eating their vegetables. But virtually all
Americans get sick, and virtually all Americans need healthcare at some
point in their lives.187
Further, just because the Court has never expressly distinguished
activity from inactivity does not mean Congress is precluded from pursuing
legislation that regulates future activity.188 Chief Justice Roberts is
concerned with the novelty of the individual mandate, but mere novelty of
action has never discouraged the Court in the past.189 The Court is
consistently asked to review new issues and interpret the scope of
constitutional powers in novel contexts, and the Court has historically
provided Congress the latitude to institute laws and regulations that are
designed to meet the country’s current economic and social needs.190
186. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
187. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2619–20 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (clarifying that “[u]nlike the market for
almost any other product or service, the market for medical care is one in which all
individuals inevitably participate. Virtually every person residing in the United States,
sooner or later, will visit a doctor or other health-care professional.”).
189. Other Supreme Court Justices and federal courts have taken the opportunity to
minimize the distinction between activity and inactivity already. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the “the
irrelevance of the action-inaction distinction”); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211,
1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (noting that “it is possible to restate most actions as
corresponding inactions with the same effect.”).
190. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also 3 Joseph
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 1123–1142 (1833)
(explaining that just because Congress has yet to act in a certain manner “is clearly what
lawyers call a non sequitur. It might with just as much propriety be urged, that, because
congress had not hitherto used a particular means to execute any other given power,
therefore it could not now do it. If, for instance, congress had never provided a ship for the
navy except by purchase, they could not now authorize ships to be built for a navy, or à
converso. [ . . . ]. If they had never erected a custom-house, or court-house, they could not
now do it. Such a mode of reasoning would be deemed by all persons wholly indefensible.”).
191. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reminding “[a]s our
national economy grows and changes, we have recognized, Congress must adapt to the
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Chief Justice Roberts limited the application of the Commerce
Clause due to fear of opening the floodgates of unchecked legislative
power.191 However, this slippery slope analysis balks against precedent and
does not provide a proper grounding for limiting the commerce power when
Roberts simultaneously advocated for deference and restraint. Roberts
believed upholding the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause
could lead to a “parade of horribles” that would allow Congress to mandate
the purchase of anything from cars to broccoli.192 Yet, this analysis is
directly opposed to Supreme Court jurisprudence. Just as the Court in Lopez
explained the link to economic activity cannot be substantiated by piling
“inference upon inference,”193 the same rule applies in reverse. The Court
should not pile inference upon inference to imagine the worst-case scenario
of legislative action.194 When addressing the scope of Congress’s spending
power, the Court in Butler explained that:
A tortured construction of the Constitution is not to be
justified by recourse to extreme examples of reckless
congressional spending which might occur if courts could
not prevent expenditures which, even if they could be
thought to [a]ffect any national purpose, would be possible
only by action of a legislature lost to all sense of public
responsibility.195
The Court’s analysis in Butler can easily be applied to the
Commerce Clause. Not only could the same “parade of horribles” be used
in reverse (if Congress cannot issue an individual mandate to compel
activity, what happens in the case of an outbreak of a deadly virus that will
only be combated by a certain antibody?), such analysis goes against a
basic tenet of the Commerce Clause power—to defer to Congress on issues
of economic and social policy.196 Not only should the Court endeavor to
changing ‘economic and financial realities.’”) (citing N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705
(1946)).
192. Id. at 2588–90 (majority opinion).
193. Id. at 2591 (2012).
194. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
195. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67, 87 (1936).
196. Id.
198. See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1825, 1829, 1868 (2011) (noting that slippery slope analysis is detrimental and
works against the deference owed to Congress, especially in regards to federal measures
such as compulsory healthcare that “might, someday soon, be desperately needed”). Not
only is the slippery slope analysis unhelpful in determining the constitutionality of the
individual mandate, it evidences the overall thesis that judicial determinations are not and
cannot be purely restrained and objective, but instead are a product of myriad subjective
influences and factors. Roberts’s use of the “parade of horribles” illustrates the other
influences that contributed to his decision, such as public policy and political and ethical
concerns. Roberts’s fear that compulsory healthcare will create a slippery slope into
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support the separation of powers between the judiciary and legislative
branches, as Roberts himself pointed out, it is beyond the scope of the
Court’s power and responsibility to weigh in on the wisdom and prudence
of legislative action.197 Justice Ginsburg most recently reaffirmed this
principle in stating; “we owe a large measure of respect to Congress when it
frames and enacts economic and social legislation.”198 Justice Clarence
Thomas reminded the Court that “[i]n areas of social and economic policy,
[t]he Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy,
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process, and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter
how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.’”199 Justice
Stevens adopted Justice Thurgood Marshall’s oft repeated mantra that
“[t]he Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid
laws.”200

unbridled commerce power is illustrative of the influences Justice Holmes identified as part
and parcel of judicial decision making. See Scott, supra note 13, at 64 (noting that Holmes
identified several factors that influence the judiciary, all reaching beyond objective logic,
and including “the felt necessity of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed”). Roberts’s concern that compulsory healthcare can turn
into compulsory produce purchases is rooted in his own public policy concerns and the
prevalent political and moral concerns a Supreme Court Justice must inevitably consider.
See Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1296 (identifying this practice
of interpretation as judges not only finding law but creating it and arguing that such creation
is inevitable. He explains that judges “create with given materials which come to them [ . . . ]
which strain and ‘feel’ in one direction rather than another and with one color and tone
rather than another,” and these subjective materials reveal “the misconception that things get
done by rules of law ‘and not men.’”). Roberts’s policy concerns are made of the stuff of his
subjective experience, and such a “parade of horribles” could just as easily be dismissed or
applied in reverse. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2619–20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (dismissing
Roberts’s fear that compulsory healthcare can bleed into other markets such as the
automobile and agriculture industries as inapplicable to other markets due to the “inevitable
yet unpredictable need for medical care”); Hall, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 1829 (identifying a parade of horribles that could come pass without compulsory
healthcare) (emphasis added).
199. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (Roberts clarifying that it is not the Court’s job to
“protect people from the consequences of their political choices”).
200. Id. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
201. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993) (quoting Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
203. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court adopts a “presumption of constitutionality” for
“regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions” and the Court is reticent
to question the legislature’s judgment and reasoning. United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). However, as clarified in Carolene, that presumption may not
apply to legislative action that is unconstitutional on its face or infringes on the Fourteenth
Amendment, especially pertaining to “discrete and insular minorities.” Id. at n.4. When
confronted with legislative action of this nature the Court applies a stricter standard of
review. Id.
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The individual mandate can find solace in the two principles of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as identified by Justice Ginsburg.201 First,
the mandate is substantially related to interstate commerce.202 Indeed, the
individual mandate is likely necessary to regulate and create equilibrium in
the healthcare market. “The large number of individuals without health
insurance, Congress found, heavily burdens the national health-care
market,”203 and the mandate serves to address an economic and social
problem that is at a breaking point for millions of Americans. Over fifty
million people are uninsured and unable to secure the necessary care they
need due to the high expense of insurance.204 Further, due to the
uninsured’s inability to secure consistent primary care, they are funneled
into emergency rooms of hospitals across the country, which are prohibited
from refusing care.205 The use of emergency care for non-emergency
purposes, especially by those that are unlikely to have the means to pay the
ensuing high medical bills, pushes the cost of healthcare up to unwieldy
levels for those Americans that can afford health insurance.206 Congress
recognized this dire social and economic issue and issued the individual
mandate as part of the cure.
Second, the Court is typically highly deferential to congressional
regulation of economic activity,207 and in Sebelius, the Court could have
adhered to precedent and granted Congress latitude in its promulgation of
the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause. Because the
individual mandate is directly and substantially related to interstate
commerce and does not violate the traditional scope of the Commerce
Clause, the Court could easily have practiced judicial restraint and deferred
to Congress in addressing this economic and social crisis.208
As discussed above, legal realism argues there is not a clear,
objective, singular answer to any complicated rule of constitutional law.209
The philosophy of judicial restraint advocates for an objective and
deferential judicial perspective in order to minimize the personal influences
on the judiciary with the hope that such deference will afford predictability
204. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(A) (2006) (“The requirement regulates activity that is
commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when
health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.”).
206. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
207. See Carmen DeNavas–Walt, et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance
Coverage in the United States: 2009, Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, 23 (2010)
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf).
208. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F) (2006).
210. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(2006).
211. Id. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
212. See Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 399 (arguing that the presumption that
precedent has but one single meaning or that for every case there is one clear answer is
false).
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and narrow the number of interpretations that can result from a legal
question.210 This note argues that true restraint is a fiction because every
judgment is inevitably a product of the judge.211 This principle is illustrated
by Justice Roberts’s interpretation of the individual mandate. The point is
not that Justice Roberts was wrong, but that a decision in the opposite
would have been just as right. Therefore, if finding the individual mandate
constitutional under the Commerce Clause would have been another right
answer, Justice Roberts’s opinion was not a product of restraint but of
activism. It is a product of the myriad of subjective influences that naturally
surround the judicial process.
b)
The Medicaid provision can be interpreted as a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to tax and spend.
Chief Justice Roberts took an unprecedented step in striking down
the ACA’s Medicaid clause, “for the first time ever find[ing] an exercise of
Congress’s spending power unconstitutionally coercive.”212 Roberts took
strides to distinguish Sebelius from South Dakota v. Dole, by adhering to
the rule set forth in Dole which defined the scope of the spending power,
but found the Medicaid provision went a step too far. Roberts found the
Medicaid provision represented a virtual “gun to the head” because of the
large percentage of funds that states’ could lose if they did not accept the
program.213 Roberts noted the financial inducement in Dole was only 5
percent of highway funds, whereas, Medicaid spending amounts to as much
as twenty percent of a state’s budget.214 Despite the fact Medicaid funds are
tendered upon the express stipulation the program can be adjusted and
changed at Congress’s will, the majority found such a threat overly coercive
and ambiguous.215 Roberts found the Medicaid provision ambiguous
because it was, in effect, not a change in degree but a “shift in kind,”
thereby creating an entirely new program.216
Although the majority determined the Medicaid provision to be
unduly coercive, another interpretation is just as plausible. Under Dole, the
Court set forth the scope of the spending power. Any actions taken under
the grant of Congress’s spending power must be “in pursuit of the general
welfare” of the nation, unambiguous, not overly coercive, and related to a
213. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 435–37 (explaining that traditional judicial philosophy
values a restrained approach that roots its decisions on the technical, objective and logical
aspects of the law because such an approach leads to greater predictability).
214. See Holmes, supra note 6; Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 400; Kennedy,
supra note 7, at 363.
215. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis in the
original); Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448; Schweiker, 655 F.2d at 406.
216. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2604–05.
219. Id. at 2605.
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federal interest.217 Further, the judiciary should provide great deference to
legislative action.218
It is clear and undisputed throughout the Sebelius decision that the
Medicaid provision was created in pursuit of the general welfare of the
nation to cure the current health care crisis in the United States.219 The real
question becomes whether the provision is indeed overly coercive and
ambiguous. When considering these questions, in spite of the deference
owed to Congress, Roberts found the answer to be “yes.”220 However, it is
just as plausible to answer with a resounding “no.”
The argument that the Medicaid provision is unduly coercive and
ambiguous is open to attack when compared with the Social Security Act
itself. The Act expressly reserves to Congress “[t]he right to alter, amend,
or repeal any provision” of the Medicaid program.221 This reservation is
not tempered by a restriction of any kind.222 It is unambiguous in that it
gives Congress the absolute right to alter and amend the program as it sees
fit.
Not only is Congress’s right to alter and amend the Medicaid
provision clear and unequivocal, Congress’s ability to use its Tax and
Spend power to induce behavior is well founded. Not only did Roberts
reinforce this principle himself,223 but the Court has long upheld such a
right. In Butler, the Court assured that “the power to tax and spend includes
the power to relieve a nationwide economic maladjustment by conditional
gifts of money.”224
However, even though Butler allowed the Tax and Spend power to
be used to induce behavior, such actions must still be done unambiguously
and in a manner that allows states to accept such conditions “voluntarily
and knowingly.”225 Under the Medicaid provision, the states are aware
Congress has to the right to alter and amend the program at any time, the
requirements are clear and unambiguous, and the states may choose or
decline to implement the program.226 It is arguable that because Congress
has the right to repeal Medicaid entirely, it surely has the right to amend its
provisions and condition its funds however it sees fit, especially when done

220. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08, 211 (1987).
221. Id. at 207–08.
222. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607; see also id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 2604–05 (majority opinion).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
225. Id.; Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
226. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (majority opinion) (explaining that “taxes that seek to
influence conduct are nothing new [ . . .] ‘the taxing power is often, very often, applied for
other purposes than revenue.’”) (citing J. Story, supra note 189, at §§ 962. 434).
227. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 88 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
228. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
229. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2637 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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in pursuit of the national welfare and to address a national economic
crisis.227
It is difficult to reconcile Roberts’s holding with his promotion of
judicial restraint when Congress has long maintained right to repeal and
amend Medicaid per 42 U.S.C. § 1304. Not only does Congress clearly
have such right, but the Medicaid provision satisfies Dole, in that it was
created to benefit the national welfare and the requirements are set forth
unambiguously.228 When discussing the individual mandate, Roberts
reminded the Court that “‘every reasonable construction must be resorted
to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’”229 However, despite
promoting a position of restraint, Roberts struck down the Medicaid
provision in its entirety, and for the first time, the Court found that
Congress’s action under the spending power was overly coercive.230 This
holding not only goes against long held Supreme Court spending power
precedent, it denies the deference typically owed to Congress. In Butler,
the Court emphasized the importance of the separation of powers and the
restraint that should be imposed on the judiciary. Justice Stone explained
that while the Executive and Legislative powers are checked by judicial
review, “the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense
of self-restraint. For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books
appeal lies, not to the courts, but to the ballot and to the processes of
democratic government.”231
Again, the question is not whether Roberts’s interpretation is
wrong, it is whether the opposite view could be just as right. Similar to the
possible interpretations of the individual mandate, the Medicaid provision
could have been upheld as constitutional under Congress’s power to tax and
spend. Roberts’s holding is again illustrative of the lack of judicial restraint
actually applied in Sebelius and evidences Roberts’s judicial activism. A
truly restrained position would apply any and “every reasonable
construction . . . in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”232 Yet
Roberts declined to accept the reasonable constructions set forth by the
government, evidencing not restraint but an opinion influenced by
subjective factors. Why Roberts practiced judicial activism disguised as
restraint is discussed below.
230. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (admonishing the Chief Justice for virtually
rewriting 42 U.S.C. § 1304 to “‘the right to alter somewhat’ or ‘amend, but not too much.’
Congress, however, did not so qualify § 1304. Indeed, Congress retained discretion to
‘repeal’ Medicaid, wiping it out entirely.”) (emphasis in the original).
231. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 203, 207–08, 211 (1987).
232. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657
(1895)).
233. Id. at 2604. For evidence of the unprecedented nature of Roberts’s decision see id.
at 2630 (Ginsburg, J. concurring); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (1989); Oklahoma
v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
234. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
235. Hooper, 155 U.S. at 657.
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V. WHY ROBERTS ADOPTED JUDICIAL RESTRAINT BUT PRACTICED
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED HIS
DECISION
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is touted as an exemplary act of
judicial restraint.233 Scholars seem to have based that opinion almost
completely on the fact that Roberts said he was going to employ judicial
restraint234 and because he decided against members of his own party.235
Yet such an interpretation is superficial and short-sighted. Roberts’s
Sebelius decision was not an exercise of judicial restraint, but was, in fact,
judicial activism, as demonstrated by his interpretation and application of
the Commerce Clause and Tax and Spend Clause. True deference and
restraint would have upheld both the individual mandate under the
Commerce Clause and the Medicaid provision as a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to tax and spend. Yet Roberts found otherwise, and that
decision was based on a myriad of factors. Such influences are not meant
to cast a shadow on Roberts or shine a spotlight on a weakness of judicial
impartiality. They are meant only to show true judicial restraint is an
impossibility, and any judicial decision is inevitably a creation of the judge
and, thus, influenced by her own subjective experience.236
Although this note argues Roberts did not actually practice judicial
restraint in the Sebelius decision, it does not say that Roberts does not value
judicial restraint and espouse it as the backbone of his judicial philosophy.
Nor is the argument as to the fictionality of judicial restraint meant to
negate the fact that Roberts, like so many Supreme Court Justices before
him, attempted in good faith to submit a restrained opinion. The only
argument is this: judicial restraint is a fiction. Whether it is a detrimental or
necessary fiction is yet to be seen.
Roberts’s belief in judicial restraint is evident throughout his career
and his tenure on the Supreme Court. Roberts advocated for “judicial
humility” during his 2005 confirmation hearings237 and continued to
promote such a philosophy throughout his opinions.238 Yet in the Sebelius,
236. See Minow, supra note 19, at 132 (applauding Roberts’s decision by explaining
that “[a] superficial view might suggest that he forged a compromise—departing from
principle—but a closer read shows that he instead reached a third position that converges
with the two groups of Justices on different issues and methods while traveling his own line
of analysis.”); Kane, supra note 19, at 56 (complimenting Roberts’s restrained approach by
noting that “[t]hroughout his opinion, the Chief Justice demonstrated a commitment not only
to adhere strictly to the law, but also to avoid inserting his or the Court’s policy choices for
those of our elected leaders”).
237. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
238. See Minow, supra note 19, at 118–19, 135–36, 140; Kane, supra note 19, at 56.
239. See Holmes, supra note 6, at 1; Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 400;
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 363.
240. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 22, at 55.
241. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 373 (2010) (Roberts, J.
concurring) (advocating for restraint and explaining that “[j]udging the constitutionality of
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despite an adoption of judicial restraint, Roberts, especially due to his
position of Chief Justice, was influenced by factors such politics,
reputation, and legacy.
Chief Justice Roberts, like all Chief Justices before him, has much
to consider beyond the multitude of briefs, oral arguments, and opinions
that will flow through the Court during his tenure. In an interview with
Jeffrey Rosen in 2007, Chief Justice Roberts discussed the characteristics of
the judiciary most important to him, and chief among those is the concern
to achieve bipartisanship and create a cohesive court. Roberts explained
that “every justice should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and
functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when they’re writing
separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.”239 He further
affirmed “[i]t’s a high priority to keep any kind of partisan divide out of the
judiciary as well.”240 With these goals in mind, Roberts explained his role
as Chief Justice is to help create a unified Court, and to do so he could and
would reward those Justices who wrote opinions that were able to attract
more votes and lessen the number of dissenting and concurring opinions.241
These goals and intentions are indeed lofty and worthwhile, but in
their very espousal demonstrate the other factors at play in the creation of
judiciary opinions. Roberts’s Sebelius decision shows the effects of these
factors. As Eric Schepard explains, “Chief Justice Roberts likely
recognized that striking down another major act of Congress along partisan
lines would severely threaten his Court’s legitimacy.”242
Roberts’s decision regarding the individual mandate further shows
the influence of political philosophies and pressures. Although upholding
the individual mandate at first resembles a win for the Obama
Administration, the opinion in full actually takes significant strides to limit
congressional power in ways unprecedented. It would be insulting to infer
that such political gains were unintentional. The Chief Justice crafted an
opinion that allowed him to successfully walk the tight rope between
partisanship, the need to create a unified court, and the desire to institute the
type of constitutional limitations he felt were necessary.
There is no reason to assume that such influences and factors are
unworthy of the Chief Justice’s position. In fact, they infuse the core of his
an Act of Congress is ‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to
perform.’”) (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48, (1927) (Holmes, J.,
concurring)). Roberts continues, explaining that the Court’s policy of judicial restraint
“underlies both our willingness to construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional
problems and our practice ‘never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” (citing United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)).
242. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATL. MONTHLY, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 105.
243. Id. at 112.
244. Id. at 110.
245. Eric Schepard, Why Harlan Fiske Stone (Also) Matters, 56 HOW. L. J. 85, 119–20
(2012).
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station. As Roberts identified, a Chief Justice must concern himself with
more than just the cases before the Court, but also with securing the
sanctity, reputation, and reliability of the Court, as well as insuring the
Court not only upholds law and the Constitution but also the separation of
powers so vital to the fabric of the nation.243 The only question is why the
judiciary cannot and does not call a spade a spade. At every turn, the Chief
Justice defended the majority opinion through a lens of judicial restraint,
when in fact there were very real political and ideological issues on the line,
and the Chief Justice took full opportunity to settle those accounts. 244 Such
an opinion is not an exercise of judicial restraint, it is judicial activism.
CONCLUSION
Through an examination of the Sebelius decision, Justice Holmes’s
proclamation that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience” rings true. Chief Justice Roberts was not wrong, he did not
misapply the law, and he did not abuse or subvert his position. His opinion
is balanced, constitutional, creative, and curative. But it is not judicial
restraint, and just as he is not wrong in his analysis, neither is he
definitively right. His opinion is influenced by his experience and his
perspective. As Karl Llewellyn espoused, there is no one correct answer.245
There are many correct answers. A true exercise of restraint would have
shown proper deference to Congress and only found components of the
ACA unconstitutional if the Act explicitly went beyond the legislature’s
enumerated powers. Yet, the ACA does not on its face fall outside of
Congress’s constitutional grant of power. As seen above, both the
individual mandate and Medicaid provision can be interpreted to fall well
within the scope of the Commerce Clause and the power to tax and spend,
respectively. Due to the fact that the ACA could just as easily be
interpreted through Justice Ginsburg’s perspective as it could Justice
Roberts’s, there must be other factors at play. These factors manifest the
inevitability of judicial activism and the impossibility of judicial restraint.
Judicial restraint is a fiction. Karl Llewellyn explained “[w]hat is
inherent is that the man must always enter into the result: it is he who must
read the words of the rule of law, it is he who must size up the facts as to
whether a rule of law applies. No rule of law ever applied itself.”246 The

246. Rosen, supra note 239, at 104.
247. Schepard, supra note 242, at 111–12 (arguing that with the Sebelius decision
“[o]nce again, a conservative Court invalidated a rationale for constitutionality of
controversial legislation that a liberal Congress passed to address a pressing national
economic problem [ . . . ][m]ost importantly, once again, the Court appealed to federalism to
advance political/ideological ‘predilections’ in favor of economic liberty that the
Constitution nowhere requires”).
248. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 399.
249. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 3, at 1304.
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only question is whether judicial restraint is a necessary or detrimental
fiction.
On one hand, judicial restraint can serve as a check on the
judiciary. By proclaiming the necessity and value of judicial restraint, the
judiciary is reminded it is beyond its scope to evaluate the wisdom of law,
and, instead, must only interpret the law.247 Such a check on judicial
powers is especially important when considering the entire allotment of
powers distributed among the branches. The judiciary checks the executive
and legislative branches along with the power of the people to cast their
vote. Yet, who checks the unelected judiciary? Without some self-imposed
restraint, is the whole system threatened?
On the other hand, continuing under a façade of judicial restraint
may work to reinforce a partisan system and leave all three branches
forever awash in the backwater of polarized, two-party political ideology.
Karl Llewellyn explains that “the court uses a conventional vocabulary that
continues to unfortunately presuppose there is only one correct answer and
so then there are two opposing canons on every part.”248 This dichotomy of
correctness is unhealthy and moves the debate away from crucial issues,
such as healthcare reform, to never-ending battles of political puffery.
The United States is indeed in the middle of a healthcare crisis.
Millions of lower income Americans are without health insurance and
millions who are sick go without care. Mothers, fathers, sons, and
daughters die of illnesses that could be treated, all because of money and a
lack thereof. In light of such a crucial issue, did Chief Justice Roberts’s
promotion of judicial restraint serve the Court in its analysis, or would a bit
of realism and recognition of judicial activism have served the Court better?
To argue that reality is always preferable is persuasive. A forthright Court
which acknowledges the inevitability of subjectivity may very well take a
step closer to bipartisanship and empower justices to address a national
crisis without overstepping their allotted constitutional powers. It is further
arguable, in regards to the ACA and the restraint so promoted by Chief
Justice Roberts, that the will of the legislature (and thus the people) should
have been upheld in full. However, whether judicial restraint is a necessary
fiction sustaining federalism and the separation of powers or a detrimental
façade keeping the country locked in two-party conflict is a question that
only time will tell.

250. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78–79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
251. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 1, at 401.

